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THE ROMANIA V. UKRAINE DECISION AND ITS 
EFFECT ON EAST ASIAN MARITIME 
DELIMITATIONS 
Jon M. Van Dyke* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2009 case Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. 
Ukraine)1 presented the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with an 
opportunity to define and give meaning to the ambiguous and disputed 
phrase in Article 121(3): “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or economic life of their own.”2  The Court declined to provide a 
definitive definition for these words in its opinion, but by determining 
that Ukraine’s tiny Serpents’ Island should have no impact whatsoever 
on the maritime boundary, the Court reconfirmed that small uninhabited 
                                            
 * Professor of Law and Carlsmith Ball Faculty Scholar, William S. Richardson 
School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Inha University Global Ocean Law 
Fellow, Incheon, Korea.  This paper is dedicated to Judge Choon-Ho Park, who focused 
throughout his distinguished career on the development of legal principles to resolve 
international disputes. 
 1. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 3), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf. 
 2. The text of Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is 
as follows:  
1.  An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide. 
2.  Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land 
territory. 
3.  Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]. 
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islands will generally have limited or no impacts on delimitations and 
that such features should not generate extended maritime zones.3   
Serpents’ Island (also called Snake Island and Ostrov Zmeinyy) is 
virtually the only island in the Black Sea, except for a few that hug the 
coasts.  It has 0.17 square kilometers of land area (forty-two acres or 
seventeen hectares) and is thirty-five kilometers (about twenty nautical 
miles) east of the Danube Delta (also called Dragon’s Beard),4 which 
forms the border between Ukraine and Romania.  It lacks freshwater 
resources and has never been inhabited historically, although it has had a 
lighthouse on it since the 1800s and recently Ukraine has built structures 
and a pier on it, apparently to strengthen its claim to the ocean space 
around it.  Its name is said to have come from the snakes that lived in a 
temple built on the islet in ancient times.  The ocean space around it has 
become a focus of great interest because recent explorations have 
indicated that high-quality oil and substantial amounts of natural gas may 
be found around this islet.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Serpents’ Island in 1896.5  
 
 
                                            
3. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at 1. 
4. See Id. at para. 16. 
5. Die Donau als Völkerweg, Schiffahrtsstasse und Reiseroute, Wien, Pest, Leizig, 
1896. 
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Figure 2: Serpents’ Island today. 
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Figure 3: The arrow indicates the location of Serpents’ Island, and 
this map also shows that the Black Sea is relatively shallow at this 
location. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: This map shows the location of Serpents’ Island in a 
relatively shallow part of the Black Sea, with the arrows indicating 
the competing boundary claims of Ukraine and Romania. 
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Figure 5: The maritime boundary claims of Romania and Ukraine.6 
 
Although sovereignty over Serpents’ Island was contested for many 
years, in 1997 Romania accepted that this feature belonged to Ukraine.7  
Romania argued before the Court that Ukraine had agreed in the 1997 
treaty that Serpents’ Island was a “rock” under Article 121(3) and 
therefore that it could not affect the maritime delimitation between the 
                                            
6. A similar map is referenced in the Court’s opinion.  Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at 9 n.1. 
 7. Id. at para. 35.  See generally Treaty on the Relations of Good-Neighbourliness 
and Co-operation between Romania and Ukraine, June 2, 1997, 2159 U.N.T.S. 335; 
Application Instituting Proceedings, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. 
Ukr.) (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/1697.pdf. 
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two countries, but Ukraine rejected that contention, stating that the 
reference to Article 121(3) was in a Romanian “declaration,” which 
Ukraine had not accepted, and that the Romanian assertion was 
“groundless.”8 
The Court’s opinion, issued February 3, 2009, avoided giving a 
comprehensive definition of the words in Article 121(3), but it did 
address the role that Serpents’ Island should play in the delimitation and 
determined that this islet should have a twelve-nautical-mile territorial 
sea, but otherwise had no effect on the delimitation.  Ukraine argued first 
that Serpents’ Island should be considered as part of Ukraine’s coast, 
because it “forms part of the geographical context and its coast 
constitutes part of Ukraine’s relevant coasts.”9  Romania responded by 
arguing that Serpents’ Island “constitutes merely a small maritime 
feature situated at a considerable distance out to sea from the coasts of 
the Parties.”10   
The Court accepted Romania’s perspective on this matter, saying 
that “[t]he coast of Serpents’ Island is so short that it makes no real 
difference to the overall length of the relevant coasts of the parties.”11  
The Court went on to say that Serpents’ Island cannot be viewed as part 
of Ukraine’s coast because it is “lying alone and some 20 nautical miles 
away from the mainland” and thus “is not one of a cluster of fringe 
islands constituting ‘the coast’ of Ukraine.”12 
According to the Court, “[t]o count Serpents’ Island as a relevant 
part of the coast would amount to grafting an extraneous element onto 
Ukraine’s coastline:  the consequence would be a judicial refashioning of 
geography, which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimitation 
authorizes.”13 
After determining that “the coasts” of the two countries basically 
followed their mainland coasts (without regard to Serpents’ Island), the 
Court began the delimitation process “by drawing a provisional 
equidistance line” between the adjacent and opposite coasts of Romania 
and Ukraine,14 and then examining “whether there are factors calling for 
the adjustment . . . of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve 
                                            
 8. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at para. 39.  
 9. Id. at para. 96. 
10. Id. at para. 92. 
11. Id. at para. 102. 
12. Id. at para. 149.  
13. Id. (analogizing Serpents’ Island to Malta’s tiny and unpopulated isle called Filfla 
(a bird sanctuary), which was completely ignored in Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 
1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3)). 
14. Id. at para. 119. 
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an equitable result,”15 and whether there was “an inequitable result by 
reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of the respective 
coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of each 
State” requiring an adjustment.16  Romania argued that Serpents’ Island 
should be ignored because it is “a rock incapable of sustaining human 
habitation or economic life of its own” under Article 121(3), and because 
“using this island as a base point would result in an inordinate distortion 
of the coastline.”17   
Ukraine responded that Serpents’ Island should be viewed as a 
“coastal island” because it is within twenty nautical miles of Ukraine’s 
coast and thus its territorial sea “partly overlaps with the area of 
territorial sea bordering the Ukrainian mainland.”18  Ukraine also argued 
that Serpents’ Island is “indisputably an ‘island’ under Article 121[(2)] . . 
. rather than a ‘rock’” because it “can readily sustain human habitation 
and that it is well established that it can sustain economic life of its 
own.”19  In particular, the island has vegetation and a sufficient supply of 
fresh water” and has “appropriate buildings and accommodation for an 
active population.”20  Finally, Ukraine argued that Article 121(3) “is not 
relevant to this delimitation because that paragraph is not concerned with 
questions of delimitation but is, rather, an entitlement provision that has 
no practical application” to a maritime area within 200 nautical miles of 
a mainland coast.21 
The Court did not directly respond to these contentions, but instead 
simply ruled that Serpents’ Island was entitled to a twelve-nautical-mile 
territorial sea around it but had no other impact on or relevance to the 
maritime delimitation between the two countries.  “As the jurisprudence 
has indicated, the Court may on occasion decide not to take account of 
very small islands or decide not to give them their full potential 
entitlement to maritime zones, should such an approach have a 
disproportionate effect on the delimitation line under consideration.”22  
                                            
15. Id. at para. 120. 
16. Id. at para. 122. 
17. Id. at para. 124. 
18. Id. at para. 126.   
19 Id. at para. 184. 
20. Id.  
21. Id.  
22. Id. at para. 185 (citing Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16); and Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between 
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.) (Oct. 8, 2007), available 
at http.//www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf. 
268 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:2 
 
That statement is understandable, focusing on the “disproportionate 
effect” that tiny Serpents’ Island would have on the delimitation.  The 
Court’s statements in the paragraphs that follow are somewhat more 
obscure,23 but, taken together, there can be no doubt but that the Court 
felt that Serpents’ Island should have no effect on the maritime 
delimitation.  In the resulting delimitation, the maritime boundary goes 
south of the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea around Serpents’ Island, 
but otherwise Romania received most of the ocean space it was seeking.   
  
                                            
23. In paragraph 187 the Court said that because of Serpents’ Island’s location and 
because “any continental shelf and exclusive economic zone entitlements possibly 
generated by Serpents’ Island could not project further than the entitlements generated by 
Ukraine’s mainland coast . . . . [T]he Court concludes that the presence of Serpents’ 
Island does not call for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line” and that “the 
Court does not need to consider whether Serpents’ Island falls under paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article 121 of UNCLOS nor their relevance to this case.”  Id. at para. 187.  Then, in 
paragraph 188, the Court said:   
The Court further recalls that a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea was attributed to 
Serpents’ Island pursuant to agreements between the Parties.  It concludes that, in 
the context of the present case, Serpents’ Island should have no effect on the 
delimitation in this case, other than that stemming from the role of the 12-nautical 
mile arc of its territorial sea.   
Id. at para. 188.   
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Figure 6: Sketch of the equidistance line established by the Court.24 
 
During the oral arguments in this case, in September 2008, Professor 
Bernard Oxman, serving as the ad hoc judge on the panel appointed by 
Ukraine, asked the agents for the two countries to discuss whether 
Article 121(3) applies to islands within 200 nautical miles of coasts or 
only to open ocean islands:   
 
Does paragraph 3 of Article 121 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea apply to marine areas that are in any event 
within the limits of the EEZ [exclusive economic zone] and 
continental shelf of the same State, such as marine areas within 
200 nautical miles of the mainland of that State?25   
                                            
24. A similar map is provided in the Court’s opinion.  Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea, 2009 I.C.J. at 66. 
25. Verbatim Record of Public Sitting, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. 
v. Ukr.) (Sept. 12, 2008), at 51, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
123/14729.pdf [hereinafter Sept. 12 Public Sitting]. 
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Oxford Professor Vaughan Lowe, who was serving as agent for 
Romania, answered “yes,”26 explaining that Article 121 governed islands 
and rocks wherever they were, and hence that Serpents’ Island could not 
be used as a base point for an exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf.27  He explained further that Serpents’ Island was a “rock” that 
“cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own,” because 
it “is totally dependent for food, water and every other human need” and 
hence “is indistinguishable from a steel platform.”28  In a mocking 
response to the Ukrainian agent’s claim that Serpents’ Island does have 
water, he said that “[s]he did not say how many bottles of water the 
island has, or how soon they will run out”29 and explained that it rains 
only 366 millimeters (fourteen inches) per year on Serpents’ Island (or 
one millimeter a day), an amount that is grossly inadequate to sustain 
human needs.30  In his earlier presentation to the Court, Professor Lowe 
had said that to meet the requirement  of being able to “sustain human 
habitation” in Article 121(3), the human habitation must be “stable” and 
“sustained,”31 explaining that the criterion of human habitation is not met 
if people are “ordered” to go to the islet by their employers.32 
The agent for Ukraine, Rodman R. Bundy, gave the opposite answer, 
saying that Article 121 does not apply to features within 200 nautical 
miles of a coast, because it is an “entitlement” provision, and “is not 
concerned with questions of delimitation.”33  Another agent of Ukraine, 
Loretta Malintoppi, argued earlier that Article 121(3) applied only to “a 
handful of exceptionally small features” such as the United Kingdom’s 
                                            
26. Verbatim Record of Public Sitting, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. 
v. Ukr.) (Sept. 16, 2008), at para. 6, at 11, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
132/14745.pdf [hereinafter Sept. 16 Public Sitting]. 
27. Id. at para. 10, at 11-12. 
28. Id. at para. 21, at 14 (emphasis in original). 
29. Id. at para. 20, at 14. 
30. Id. at para. 22, at 14. 
31. Verbatim Record of Public Sitting Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea 
(Romania v. Ukraine) (Sept. 4, 2008), at para. 30, at 45, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/132/14707.pdf (last visited June 10, 2010), [hereinafter Sept. 4 Public 
Sitting]. 
32. Id. at para. 32, at 45. 
33. Verbatim Record of Public Sitting Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. 
v. Ukr.) (Sept. 19, 2008), at para. 26, at 22, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/132/14753.pdf [hereinafter Sept. 19 Public Sitting]. 
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Rockall, northwest of Scotland,34 which, as the United Kingdom has 
acknowledged, does not generate extended maritime zones.35   
II. CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER DECISIONS GIVING LIMITED OR NO 
EFFECT TO SMALL ISLANDS 
Although the ICJ in its Romania v. Ukraine decision does not 
completely resolve the question of how Article 121(3) should be 
interpreted, the Court’s ruling strongly favoring the Romanian position 
certainly confirms earlier decisions holding similarly that small features 
will be ignored or will be given greatly reduced effect in maritime 
delimitations, that islands do not have an equal capacity with land masses 
to create maritime zones, and that islands do not command equal strength 
with an opposing continental area or land mass.36  These propositions 
                                            
34. Sept. 16 Public Sitting, supra note 26, at para. 52, at 17. 
35. Rockall is a towering granite feature measuring about sixty-one meters (200 feet) 
in circumference, and is about twenty-one meters (seventy feet) high.  It is located about 
300 kilometers (190 miles) from the British territory of St. Kilda off the Outer Hebrides 
of Scotland, about 380 kilometers (240 miles) from the Irish coastal county of Donegal, 
about 320 miles from the Faroes, and about 400 miles from Iceland.  For the U.K. 
decision recognizing that Rockall did not have the capacity to generate extended 
maritime zones, see The Fishery Limits Order 1997, 1997 S.I. 1750, available at 
http://www.uk-legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1997/19971750.htm.  See generally D.H. 
Anderson, British Accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 46 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 761, 778 (1997) (citing 298 House 
of Commons Hansard 397 (Written Answers) (1997)). 
36. Islands can generate maritime zones, see supra text accompanying note 2, but 
they do not generate full zones when they are opposite or adjacent to continental land 
areas or substantially larger islands.  This conclusion has been reached consistently by the 
International Court of Justice and arbitral tribunals.  See, e.g., North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), at para. 101(d); Arbitration 
Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French 
Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Mar. 14, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 397; 
Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya) (Feb. 24), 1982 I.C.J. 18; Continental Shelf (Libya v. 
Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of 
Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Delimitation of the Maritime 
Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, Feb. 14, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 252; 
Delimitation of the Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan 
Mayan (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 3); Delimitation of the Maritime Area 
Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), June 10, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1145; 
Maritime Delimitation (Eri. v. Yemen) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1996), available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/EY%20Phase%20II.pdf; Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Quatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 
16); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 3). 
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were introduced in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case,37 and 
implemented in the Anglo-French Arbitration with significant impact.38   
Recent cases have shown no deviation from this approach.  In the 
1999 Eritrea v. Yemen Arbitration, the tribunal gave no effect 
whatsoever to the uninhabited Yemeni island of Jabal al-Tayr and to the 
uninhabited Yemeni islands in the Zubayr group (which are on the 
“wrong side” of the equidistance line between the two countries in the 
Red Sea), stating simply that their “barren and inhospitable nature and 
their position well out to sea . . . mean that they should not be taken into 
consideration in computing the boundary line . . . .”39  Jabal al-Tayr is a 
volcanic island with a lighthouse on it; it erupted dramatically on 
September 30, 2007, after 124 years of dormancy.  The islets in the 
Zubayr group also have lighthouses on them and are visited because of 
their clear waters and pristine beaches.  Similarly, in the 2001 Qatar v. 
Bahrain decision, the ICJ completely ignored the small, uninhabited, and 
barren Bahraini islet of Qit’at Jaradah, situated midway between the two 
countries, explaining that it would be inappropriate to allow such an 
insignificant maritime feature to have a disproportionate effect on a 
maritime delimitation line.40  The Court also completely ignored the 
“sizeable maritime feature” of Fasht al Jarim, of which “at most a minute 
part is above water at high tide.”41    
Also of significance is the 2007 case Nicaragua v. Honduras, where 
the two countries asked the ICJ to determine who had sovereignty over 
four small cays (Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay, and South 
Cay) located just north of the fifteenth parallel, about thirty miles 
offshore in the Caribbean Sea.42  These “small, low islands composed 
largely of sand . . . remain above water at high tide.”43  They contain 
wooden buildings, and, as of 1999, were inhabited by Jamaican fishers.  
                                            
37. North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. para. 101(d), at 53. 
38. Arbitration Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Mar. 14, 1978, 18 
I.L.M. 397 (the United Kingdom’s islands of Jersey and Guernsey, which are on the 
“wrong side” of the equidistance line between Britain proper and the French coast, were 
given twelve-nautical-mile territorial-sea enclaves, but otherwise did not affect the 
maritime delimitation; Britain’s Scilly Isles were given “half effect”). 
39. Maritime Delimitation (Eri. v. Yemen) (Perm. Ct. Arb.) at para. 147, at 45.  
40. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain 
(Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 40, (Mar. 16). 
41. Id. at 115.  Photos found on the internet show small pavilions on Fasht al Jarim to 
provide shelter from the sun for visitors.   
42. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, (Oct. 8). 
43. Id. at para. 28, at 15, para. 137, at 40. 
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Despite the periodic inhabitation of these islets, both Nicaragua and 
Honduras informed the International Court of Justice that they had 
agreed not to make any claim that the cays could generate “any maritime 
areas beyond the territorial sea.”44  The Court then determined that 
Honduras had the better claim to sovereignty over the cays, and 
proceeded to draw territorial sea enclaves around them, but otherwise 
ignored them in determining the maritime boundary between the two 
countries.45  The resolution of this dispute thus serves as another example 
of state practice where countries have concluded that small islets are not 
entitled to generate exclusive economic zones and should be ignored in 
delimiting a maritime boundary.46   
These consistent decisions limiting the ability of uninhabited insular 
features to generate extended maritime zones are linked to the underlying 
rationales for the creation of these extended zones.  Judge Budislav 
Vukas of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea explained in 
his opinion written in the Russia v. Australia case in 2002 that the 
purpose for giving exclusive rights over offshore resources to coastal 
states through the establishment of the exclusive economic zone was to 
protect the economic interests of the coastal communities that depended 
on the resources of the sea and thus to promote their development and 
                                            
44. Id. 
45. See id. 
46. Another recent dispute involves Pedra Branca, the tiny islet (also known as 
Horsburgh Light) awarded to Singapore by the ICJ in May 2008.  Case Concerning 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge 
(Malay. v. Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. 130, (May 23), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf.  It has a lighthouse on it but has never been inhabited.   
In July 2008, Singapore claimed that it could draw an EEZ from Pedra Branca, and 
because of its location, if it were able to generate an EEZ, such a claim would affect the 
EEZ of Malaysia.  Malaysia has strongly protested Singapore’s claim, arguing that Pedra 
Branca must be considered a “rock” under Article 121(3).  Datuk Cheah Kong Wai, the 
director-general of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, explained in July 2008 that to 
generate an EEZ a feature must have “a habitable environment that allows humans to live 
independently based on resources available naturally.  Humans should have access to 
basic necessities such as fresh water without having to rely on sources from outside and 
also be able to carry out economic activities such as farming, fishing, or livestock 
rearing.”  Pedra Branca EEZ: Singapore’s Claim on Shaky Ground, VOICE OF 
MALAYSIAN, July 24, 2008, available at http://voiceofmalaysian.com/tag/pedra-branca-
eez-singapore%E2%80%99s-claim-on-shaky-ground/ (interview of Datuk Cheah Kong 
Wai, the director-general of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia).  He added that operating 
a lighthouse does not qualify as an “economic activity” because “it is an act of facilitating 
navigation, a requirement [imposed by the Law of the Sea Convention] on states 
bordering a strait.”  Id.   
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enable them to feed themselves.47  This rationale does not apply to 
uninhabited islands because they have no coastal fishing communities 
that require such assistance.  Similarly, the late Professor Jonathan 
Charney explained in a 1999 article that “the primary purpose of Article 
121(3) was to ensure that insignificant features, particularly those far 
from other states, could not generate broad zones of national jurisdiction 
in the middle of the ocean.”48  Professor Charney went on to say that: 
The common spaces are diminished by using such rocks as a 
basis for placing a maritime area under a coastal state’s 
jurisdiction when it would otherwise be beyond national 
jurisdiction.  This practice would directly conflict with the 
objective of Article 121(3):  to protect the commons from 
nationalization based on minor features with little significance 
other than being above water at high tide.49 
Professor Charney has also explained that “[o]utside state support for 
a non-economically viable occupation would be inconsistent with this 
requirement [of being able to sustain ‘economic life of their own’].”50   
III. UNRESOLVED MARITIME DELIMITATIONS IN EAST ASIA: THE EAST 
SEA 
How does the Romania v. Ukraine decision apply to the maritime 
delimitation in the East Sea/Sea of Japan?  This boundary remains 
unresolved, in large part because Japan still disputes Korea’s sovereignty 
over Dokdo, a set of tiny islets located between the two countries.51  The 
Romania v. Ukraine decision provides strong support for the conclusion 
that Dokdo should have a twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea, but should 
not otherwise affect this delimitation.  Dokdo is virtually the same size as 
Serpents’ Island, having 0.18 square kilometers of land area, as 
compared to Serpents’ Island’s 0.17 square kilometers.   
 
 
                                            
47. The “Volga” Case (Russ. v. Austl.), 2002 ITLOS Reports 11, available at 
www.itlos.org/start2_en.html (declaration of Vice-President Vukas). 
48. Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 863, 866 (1999). 
49. Id. at 876. 
50. Id. at 870 n.34. 
51. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its 
Maritime Boundary, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INTN’L L. 157 (2007) (explaining that Korea’s 
claim to sovereignty over Dokdo is substantially stronger than that of Japan). 
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Figure 7: Images comparing Serpents’ Island and Dokdo. 
 
Dokdo has stark physical beauty, military personnel have been 
stationed on it for the past several decades, and fishing families 
occasionally take up temporary residence on it.  But its two main islets 
and smaller outcroppings remain essentially barren, rocky, and 
uninhabitable.  The distinguished Korean scholar Choung Il Chee wrote 
in his 1999 book that Dokdo “is a rocky island and unsuitable for human 
inhabitation.”52  Similarly, Han Key Lee has written that “this barren 
group of islets [is] unfit for sustained human habitation.”53  Professor 
(now Judge) Jin-Hyun Paik of Seoul National University wrote in 1998 
that “the natural conditions of the Dokdo Islands would suggest that 
                                            
52. CHOUNG IL CHEE, KOREAN PERSPECTIVES ON OCEAN LAW ISSUES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 15 (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999). 
53. Han Key Lee, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo in History and International 
Law, 29 KOREA OBSERVER 1, 5 (1998) (translated and reprinted from Lee Han-key, 
Tokdo, in HAN’GUK UI YONGT’O [KOREA’S TERRITORY] (Seoul: Seoul National University 
Press, 1969).   
Serpents’ 
Island –
0.17 square 
kilometers
Dokdo –
0.18 square 
kilometers
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these islands might not generate their own EEZs or continental 
shelves.”54   
It would appear, therefore, that Dokdo should be considered to be a 
“rock” that “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] 
own” under Article 121(3).  Some have argued otherwise by quoting 
from Professor Charney’s 1999 article where he speculated that 
economic activity in the waters surrounding an islet could arguably 
constitute an “economic life of their own” to allow the islet to generate 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ).55  This bootstrapping approach has 
not been accepted, however, and when it has been asserted—by, for 
instance, Japan with regard to Okinotorishima—it has met with strong 
resistance by neighboring countries.56  
Even if Dokdo were somehow to be considered to be an “island” 
rather than a “rock” under Article 121, it would not be given much 
importance by a tribunal asked to delimit the maritime boundary between 
Korea and Japan because of its tiny size and relative insignificance 
because, as explained above,57 tribunals have repeatedly ignored or 
slighted islands in maritime delimitations, even ones that have substantial 
populations residing on them.  The boundary in the East Sea should 
therefore be drawn without regard to Dokdo and should follow the 
equidistance line between Korea’s Ullungdo and Japan’s Oki Islands,58 
as shown in the map below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
54. Van Dyke, supra note 51, at 197 (citing Jin-Hyun Paik, Evolution of Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation Law and Its Implications on Northeast Asia Law (paper delivered 
at the 1st Annual Korean-US Marine Policy Forum, Seoul, Oct. 22-23, 1998)). 
55. Charney, supra note 42, at 863. 
56. See infra text at notes 65-70 
57. See supra text at notes 36-50. 
58. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Disputes Over Islands and Maritime Boundaries in East 
Asia, in MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 39, 46-52 (Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M. Van Dyke eds., 2009). 
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Figure 8: The disputed area in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, with an 
arrow indicating the author’s view of the appropriate maritime 
boundary. 
 
IV. THE SENKAKU/DIAOYUDAO ISLANDS 
The Romania v. Ukraine decision also should help dispel the notion 
that the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands should have any impact on the 
maritime delimitation of the East China Sea.  These eight uninhabited 
island features in the East China Sea, 170 kilometers northeast of 
Taiwan, are now controlled by Japan but are also claimed by Taiwan and 
by the People’s Republic of China.  Altogether, they have a land area of 
seven square kilometers; the largest (Diaoyudao/Uotsurishima) has an 
area of 4.3 square kilometers, with two peaks rising to about 1100 feet, 
but has no anchorages for any but the smallest ships to use for landings.  
Historically, these outcroppings have been used only as navigational 
aids.  
In 1970, after its claim to the Senkakus/Diaoyudao based on an 
extension of its continental shelf had been protested by Japan, Taiwan 
issued a reservation when ratifying the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, stating that in “determining the boundary of the 
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continental shelf of the Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall 
not be taken into account.”59  The prominent scholar from the People’s 
Republic of China Ji Guoxing has reported that the current position of 
the People’s Republic of China is similar:  “China holds that the 
Diaoyudao Islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic 
life of their own, and that they are not entitled to have a continental 
shelf.”60  This view has been reinforced by the decision of the ICJ to  
ignore completely Serpents’ Island in delimiting the boundary between 
Romania and Ukraine, and now it should be clear that the 
Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands should receive a twelve-nautical-mile 
territorial sea but should otherwise be ignored in determining the 
maritime delimitation of the East China Sea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
59. CLIVE R. SYMMONS, THE MARITIME ZONES OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
136 (The Hague ed., Martinus Nijhoff & Kluwer Boston, Inc. 1979) (citing Allen & 
Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East China Sea, 51 OR. L. REV. 
789, 808 (1972)). 
60. Ji Guoxing, The Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospects for Settlement, 6 
KOREAN J. OF DEF. ANALYSIS 285, 306 (1994).   
Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao
5 small volcanic islands & 3 rocky 
outcroppings.
Total land area = 7 sq km.
Largest is Uotsuri/Diaoyu = 8 hectares.
None is inhabited.
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V. THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan have 
all made claims to some or all of the twenty-five to thirty-five Spratly 
Islands in the South China Sea and to ocean space in that semi-enclosed 
sea.61  The largest islet (Itu Aba) is 0.43 square kilometers in area, 
Spratly Island is 0.15 square kilometers (about the same size as Serpents’ 
Island and Dokdo), and only five others are larger than 0.1 square 
kilometer.62  Although visited historically by wandering fishers and now 
guarded by military police, none of these islets has ever been inhabited 
by a stable or sustained population.  The Romania v. Ukraine decision 
makes it clear that they should be given twelve-nautical-mile territorial 
seas but ignored in the delimitation of the boundaries in the South China 
Sea, because any reliance upon them would “have a disproportionate 
effect on the delimitation line under consideration.”63 
                                            
61. See generally MARK J. VALENCIA, JON M. VAN DYKE & NOEL A. LUDWIG, 
SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA (1997).  The insular features above 
water at high tide are also described in id. at 227-35. 
62. See SYMMONS, supra note 59, at 68.   
63. See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 2, at para. 185. 
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Figure 10: The South China Sea, showing the claimed Spratly Island 
features, and the maritime delimitation that would be appropriate if 
defensible coastal baselines were used and all the Spratly features 
were entirely ignored, but the Paracel Islands given full effect.64 
                                            
64. MARK J. VALENCIA, JON M. VAN DYKE, & NOEL A. LUDWIG, SHARING THE 
RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 265 (1997). 
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VI. OKINOTORISHIMA 
Another matter that may have been clarified by the Romania v. 
Ukraine decision is whether the tiny reef system called Okinotorishima, 
sometimes referred to as Douglas Reef, which was claimed by Japan in 
1931, is entitled to generate an EEZ and continental shelf.  This reef 
system is 1740 kilometers south of Tokyo, and is thus the southernmost 
Japanese possession.  At high tide, only two natural structures remain 
some seventy centimeters above water; these features in their natural 
form were about the size of two king-size beds (or four and a half tatami 
mats).  But since 1987, Japan has been trying to protect these tiny pieces 
of real estate from being washed away by erosion and from sinking into 
the sea by spending billions of yen to bring vast amounts of wave-
dissipating concrete blocks and cement to the location.  China has 
acknowledged Japan’s possession of this islet but has strongly protested 
against the claim that it can generate an EEZ, contending that it is a 
“rock” and not an “island” under Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea 
Convention.65 
Some have argued that the ability of tiny insular structures to 
generate extended maritime zones if they are in the open ocean should be 
governed by different rules than those that apply to the treatment of tiny 
islets in boundary delimitations.  Ukraine’s agent, Rodman R. Bundy, 
argued, for instance, that Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea 
Convention has “no relevance” to small insular features “within the 200-
nautical-mile limits of the EEZ and continental shelf of a mainland 
coast” and only applies to features outside coastal EEZs such as 
Rockall.66  The better view, and the one apparently adopted by the Court 
in the Romania v. Ukraine dispute, is the one offered by Romania’s 
                                            
65. On Feb. 6, 2009, China protested Japan’s claim to a continental shelf generated 
from Okinotorishima, saying:  “It is to be noted that the so-called Oki-no-Tori Shima 
Island is in fact a rock as referred to in Article 121(3) of the Convention . . . .  Available 
scientific data fully reveals that the rock of Oki-no-Tori, on its natural conditions, 
obviously cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own, and therefore 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Three weeks later, on Feb. 
27, 2009, the Republic of Korea issued a similar protest, saying “the Republic of Korea 
has consistently held the view that Oki-no-Tori Shima, considered as a rock under Article 
121( paragraph 3) of the Convention, is not entitled to any continental shelf extending to 
or beyond 200 nautical miles . . . .”  See generally Yann-huei Song, Okinotorishima:  A 
“Rock” or an “Island”?  Recent Maritime Boundary Controversy between Japan and 
Taiwan/China, in MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 39, 46-52 (Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M. Van Dyke eds., 2009). 
66. Sept. 19 Public Sitting, supra note 33, at para. 27, at 22. 
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agent, Professor Vaughan Lowe, who explained that Article 121 applies 
to all islands and rocks: 
There is nothing in the Article which says that it applies only to 
islands on the high seas, or beyond the EEZ or continental shelf, 
or at a certain distance from the coast.  Nothing in the 
Convention even hints at that possibility.  Nor is there anything 
in the travaux preparatoires which indicates that any such 
limitation should be read into the words of the Article.67 
As explained above,68 Professor Lowe emphasized that Serpents’ 
Island was incapable of sustaining human habitation because it was 
“totally dependent for food, water, and every other human need” and 
thus was “indistinguishable from a steel platform.”69  It therefore falls 
within Article 121(3) and “cannot be used as a base point” for the 
generation “of either an EEZ or a continental shelf.”70 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
67. Sept. 16 Public Sitting, supra note 26, at para. 7, at 11. 
68. See supra text at pp 12, 16. 
69. Sept. 16 Public Sitting, supra note 26, at para. 21, at 14 (emphasis in original). 
70. Id. at para 25, at 15. 
Okinotorishima
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Although the Romania v. Ukraine decision does not contain a 
comprehensive discussion of Article 121(3) or a definition of the terms 
used in that provision, the Court’s conclusion—that Ukraine’s tiny and 
uninhabited Serpents’ Island should have a twelve-nautical-mile 
territorial sea but no other impact on the maritime delimitation between 
the two countries—should make it easier to resolve the unresolved 
maritime boundaries of East Asia.  Now that it is clear that such small 
features should be ignored because any reliance upon them would “have 
a disproportionate effect on the delimitation line under consideration,”71 
it should be less difficult to reach agreement on where the maritime 
boundaries should be drawn. 
 
                                            
71. Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 1, para. 185  
(Feb. 3) (internal citations omitted). 
